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Tamas Krausz1 
 
On the workers’ councils of 19ͻͼ 
 
Prehistory2 
 
he historǇ of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils of ϭϵϱϲ ĐaŶŶot ďe uŶderstood 
without the history of the Hungarian working class. The intellectual-
political and socio-cultural development of the Hungarian working class 
has been shaped by diverse and complex historical processes in the interwar 
period. The counter-revolutionary system of Horthy destroyed and criminalized 
the 1918-ϭϵϭϵ reǀolutioŶarǇ traditioŶ of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils of the HuŶgariaŶ 
working class, it banned the communist party and it declared in the name of the 
sanctity of private property that communal property – which was defined as the 
esseŶĐe of soĐialisŵ froŵ Marǆ aŶd LeŶiŶ till )sigŵoŶd KuŶfi, Justus aŶd LukáĐs – 
was a sinful idea. The official Christian-nationalist ideology, which defined the 
treaty of Trianon as the ruin of Hungary, put the revisionist aspirations – which 
followed from the policy of the ruling classes - in the center of the national policy 
and memory. This served later as the basis of the alliance with the Nazi Germany 
in the period of the Second World War. In spite of the decade-long, nationalist 
brainwashing the former, predominantly multiethnic Hungarian industrial skilled 
working class, which constituted the backbone of organized labor of about one 
hundred thousand members, remained loyal to social democracy even in the most 
difficult times. At the same time with the Nazi advance the extreme rightist-
Hungarian Nazi (Arrow Cross) organizations and the racist-anti-Semitic ideologies 
of the system also took root among the unemployed masses in the periphery of 
the working class of the small-scale industry, mainly in the outskirts of Budapest. 
At the end of the war the anti-war efforts of the social democrat and 
communist parties found a positive reception in the wide masses of the working 
class. Even though in Hungary there was no popular uprising against the Nazis and 
their associates, by 1945 the Marxist, socialist ideas became embedded in the 
consciousness of the politically interested - even though relatively thin - layer of 
the ǁorkiŶg Đlass. NatioŶal Đoŵŵittees aŶd other orgaŶizatioŶs of people’s self-
management were established spontaneously, which is the best evidence that 
                                                 
1 E TokióďaŶ ŵegtartott elődásoŵat ajáŶloŵ Balogh AŶdrás professzorŶak, kitűŶő kollégáŵŶak ϳϬ. 
születésŶapjára egǇ általa is jól isŵert értékreŶd jegǇéďeŶ. 
2 For more literature see: HAJDU Tibor: Közép-Euƌópa foƌƌadalŵa ϭϵϭϳ-1921 (The revolution of 
Central Europe 1917-1921) Budapest, Gondolat, 1989. SIPOS Péter: Legális és illegális 
ŵuŶkásŵozgaloŵ (ϭϵϭϵ-1944) (Legal and illegal labor movement 1919-1944) Budapest, Gondolat, 
1988. Id. A ŵuŶkásaƌisztokƌáĐia saŶǇaƌgatása ;TorŵeŶtiŶg laďor aristoĐraĐǇͿ. História, ϮϬϬϲ. Ŷo 4. 20-
22. KENDE JáŶos: Foƌƌadaloŵƌól foƌƌadaloŵƌa. Az ϭϵϭϴ-1919-es foƌƌadalŵak MagǇaƌoƌszágoŶ (From 
revolution to revolution: The revolutions of 1918-1919 in Hungary). Budapest., Gondolat, 1979. 
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there were forces of a renewal at the bottom of society. By destroying the Nazi 
war machine and expelling the forces of the Arrow Cross and other extreme 
rightist organizations, which participated also in the murder of the Hungarian 
Jews, the liberating Soviet troops gave a background for the Hungarian left and the 
weak antifascist bourgeois forces to denazify the country. At the same time, 
however, the communist party, which enjoyed the support of the Soviets, also 
exploited the nationalist and autocratic ideologies during „deŶazifiĐatioŶ͟. In 
everyday politics the party frequently disregarded the national traditions and 
conditions as well as the traditions of the Hungarian labor movement and it more 
and more mechanically copied the model of the Soviet development. The 
turnabout of the Cold War in the summer of 1947 definitely forced the leaders of 
the communist party (MKP, Hungarian Communist Party, from 1948 MDP, 
HuŶgariaŶ Workers’ PartǇͿ to folloǁ the Soǀiet path. The forĐed iŶdustrializatioŶ 
essentially involved the formation of a new, large-scale industrial proletariat, 
which should have fulfilled the role of the „leadiŶg Đlass of soĐialisŵ͟ and the 
„Ŷeǁ ƌuliŶg Đlass͟ according to the ideology of legitimation of the new system. In 
the „state of the ǁoƌkiŶg Đlass͟, however, this „ƌuliŶg Đlass͟ was expected to pay 
all costs of the forced industrialization in every aspect – and the consequences are 
well known. After 1953 the half-hearted „de-“taliŶizatioŶ͟ liberated also the forces 
of anger and indignation and in 1956 the revolutionary spirit against the personal 
cult was let out of the bottle. 
 
The social nature of the workers’ councils  
 
SiŵilarlǇ to the RussiaŶ ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils of ϭϵϬϱ aŶd ϭϵϭϳ aŶd the HuŶgariaŶ 
ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils of ϭϵϭϴ-ϭϵ, the origiŶ of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils of ϭϵϱϲ ǁere 
connected with two circumstances, which were inseparable from each other: the 
general political crisis and the search for a new alternative. They sought to destroy 
the old political system by organizing a general strike and to restart and reorganize 
production on a new basis. It was decisively the reorganization of the production 
process and the ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐoŶtƌol of the factories and production where the activity 
of the HuŶgariaŶ ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils of ϭϵϱϲ ǁas ĐoŶŶeĐted ǁith the ŵaŶifestatioŶ 
of the traditional idea of the communality of labor and some characteristics of 
reǀolutioŶarǇ aŶarĐhisŵ. Hoǁeǀer, ǁhile the Soǀiet ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils aŶd that of 
the Hungarian Soviet Republic rebelled against the old capitalist system, the 
HuŶgariaŶ ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils of ϭϵϱϲ siŵultaneously sought to „ĐoŵŵuŶalize͟ 
state soĐialisŵ aŶd preǀeŶt the Đapitalist restoratioŶ. The HuŶgariaŶ ǁorkers’ 
councils originated not only in the severe political and economic oppression of the 
tyranny, the low standard of living and the violation of basic human rights but also 
in the inability of the rival groups of the party elite to adopt at least the „Polish 
ŵodel͟ for the solution of the created political crisis: the leadership of the 
communist party broke up into fractions which fought against each other. 
The ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐils ǁeƌe estaďlished spoŶtaŶeouslǇ also iŶ HuŶgaƌǇ. As it is well 
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kŶoǁŶ, the ŵost direĐt iŶflueŶĐe oŶ the HuŶgariaŶ ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils ǁas the 
deǀelopŵeŶt of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils iŶ Yugoslaǀia ďeĐause there ǁere Ŷo other 
contemporary experiences and the Yugoslavian example could be also used as a point 
of reference. In the eyes of the „ƌefoƌŵ ĐoŵŵuŶists͟ who sought to „huŵaŶize͟ 
soĐialisŵ, these ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils ǁere the raǇs of hope iŶdiĐatiŶg the surǀiǀal of the 
aspirations of soĐialist ǁorkers’ self-management within the bureaucratic system of 
state soĐialisŵ. The ďrief historǇ of the HuŶgariaŶ ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils ;froŵ OĐtoďer 
1956 till January 1957) proves that socialism in the form of self-management took root 
in the consciousness of part of the working class.3 It, however, facilitated the 
Yugoslavian development that the Yugoslavs – contrary to the Hungarian people – 
liberated their country themselves, practically without Soviet help. Contrary to the 
Yugoslavian development the Hungarians – so to speak – readily received the 
opportunity of the socialist development and they „iŶheƌited͟ its Stalinist-state socialist 
variant, which had no roots in the national development and conditions. In spite of 
this, the forces, which were interested in the restoration of private property and the 
Horthy-system, and joined the camp of Cardinal Mindszenty during the uprising of 
1956, did not dare to declare their antisocialist objectives clearly and openly but they 
formulated obscure promises of a mixed economy. 
The HuŶgariaŶ ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils of ϭϵϱϲ left a large Ŷuŵďer of doĐuŵeŶts of 
their activity to the succeeding generations.4 Their most important legacy was, 
however, the aspiration to establish a direct ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐoŶtƌol over the state and 
production bureaucracy, organized from below. In other words, their agenda was 
to communalize state socialism. Formed by spontaneous necessity on 31 October, 
the ParliaŵeŶt of Workers’ CouŶĐils - with the participation of twenty-four large 
enterprises, the peasaŶt alliaŶĐes of fiǀe ĐouŶties aŶd soŵe iŶtelleĐtual ǁorkers’ 
councils - consented to the following classical document of the rights and basic 
                                                 
3 JáŶos Kádár hiŵself aĐkŶoǁledged this oŶ ϭ Noǀeŵďer at the ŵeetiŶg of the Presidiuŵ of CC of 
the Communist Party of the USSR when he repeatedly called the uprising a „national democratic 
ƌeǀolutioŶ͟ precisely because of the support of the significant masses of the working class. With this 
Kádár also referred to the daŶger of a ĐouŶter-revolution – either oŶ ďehalf of the ĐliĐk of Rákosi-Gerő 
or the supporters of the restoration of the Horthy-regime. A. A. FURSZENKO (ed.): Prezidium CK KPSZSZ 
1954-1964, volume 1. Csernovie zapiszi zaszedanyii. Sztyenogrammi, Moszkva, ROSZSZPEN, 2003. 196. 
4 For literature see: KEMÉNY IstǀáŶ aŶd Bill LOMAX (eds.): MagǇaƌ ŵuŶkástaŶáĐsok ϭϵϱϲ-ban. 
Dokumentumok ;HuŶgariaŶ ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils iŶ ϭϵ56: Documents). MagǇar Füzetek, Párizs, ϭϵϴϲ. Bill 
LOMAX: MagǇaƌoƌszág ϭϵϱϲ (Hungary 1956). Aura, 1989. TÓTH Eszter )sófia: A Csepel Vas- és 
Féŵŵűǀek ŵuŶkástaŶáĐsaiŶak töƌtéŶete és a ŵuŶkástaŶáĐs eŵlékezete ;The historǇ of the ǁorkers’ 
ĐouŶĐils of Csepel IroŶ aŶd Metal Works aŶd the ŵeŵorǇ of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐilͿ. MaŶusĐript, ϮϬϬϲ. 
FEITL IstǀáŶ: PaƌlaŵeŶtaƌizŵus és öŶigazgatás az ϭϵϱϲ-os forradalomban (Parliamentarism and self-
ŵaŶageŵeŶt iŶ the reǀolutioŶ of ϭϵϱϲͿ. MúltuŶk, ϮϬϬϱ. Ŷo 2. 231-243. Id.: A ŵagǇaƌ ŵuŶkástaŶáĐsok 
és az öŶigazgatás ϭϵϱϲ-ban ;The HuŶgariaŶ ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils aŶd self-management in 1956) . 
Eszŵélet, Ŷo 2. (1989.) 42-52. MOLNÁR JáŶos: A NagǇďudapesti KözpoŶti MuŶkástaŶáĐs (The Central 
Workers’ CouŶĐil of Great BudapestͿ. Budapest, Akadéŵiai Kiadó, ϭϵϲϵ. A foƌƌadaloŵ előzŵéŶǇei, 
alakulása és utóélete. TaŶulŵáŶǇok és kroŶológia ;The preliŵiŶaries, deǀelopŵeŶt aŶd afterlife of the 
reǀolutioŶ: Studies aŶd ĐhroŶologǇͿ. Párizs-New Jersey, 1987. RIPP )oltáŶ: ϭϵϱϲ. Foƌƌadaloŵ és 
szaďadsághaƌĐ MagǇaƌoƌszágoŶ (1956. Revolution and fight for freedom in Hungary). Budapest, 
KoroŶa Kiadó, ϮϬϬϮ. 
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priŶĐiples of the fuŶĐtioŶiŶg of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils: „1. The factory belongs to 
the workers. The workers pay a tax and a determined share from the profit to the 
state after the production of the factory. 2. The chief organ of management is the 
ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐil, ǁhiĐh the ǁoƌkeƌs eleĐt deŵoĐƌatiĐallǇ. ϯ. The ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐil 
elects a management committee of three-eight people from its members, which is 
the peƌŵaŶeŶt oƌgaŶ of the ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐil. The Đoŵŵittee is also ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ 
other tasks that will be determined later in detail. 4. The chief manager is the 
employee of the factory. The manager and other employees who fulfill more 
ƌespoŶsiďle positioŶs aƌe eleĐted ďǇ the ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐil. The ŵaŶageŵeŶt 
committee has to invite applications for these posts before the election. 5. The 
ŵaŶageƌ, ǁho ƌuŶs the faĐtoƌǇ, is ƌespoŶsiďle to the ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐil. ϲ. The 
ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐil ƌeseƌǀes the folloǁiŶg ƌights: A) consent to every plan of the 
enterprise, B) determines the wage fund and its use, C) determines every foreign 
transfer contracts, D) decides every credit operation. 
ϳ. IŶ Đase of dispute the ǁoƌkeƌs’ council decides the beginning and termination 
of eŵploǇŵeŶt ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg eǀeƌǇ eŵploǇee. ϴ. The ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐil also has to 
consent to the balances and it decides the allocation of profit, which has been left 
foƌ the eŶteƌpƌise. ϵ. The ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐil is also responsible for the social welfare 
of the eŶteƌpƌise.͟5  
IŶ the ďegiŶŶiŶg the politiĐal aĐtiǀitǇ of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils ǁas ŵaiŶlǇ loĐal – 
apart from the general political demands (withdrawing of Soviet troops, national 
independence, democratic parliamentary elections). This activity was, however, 
extended when the Soviet troops marched in on 4 November and a new crisis 
ďegaŶ. WithiŶ the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils the direĐtioŶ, ǁhiĐh eŶǀisaged the uŶioŶ of 
ǁorkers’ self ŵaŶageŵeŶt ǁith ŵulti-party democracy, where constitutional 
guarantees were supposed to protect the bases of socialism against the capitalist 
restoration, was strengthened. The Secretary of State of the government of Imre 
Nagy, the well-kŶoǁŶ HuŶgariaŶ iŶtelleĐtual jurist, IstǀáŶ Biďó forŵulated this 
idea iŶ a speĐial prograŵ draft oŶ ϲ Noǀeŵďer. The Workers’ CouŶĐil of Great 
Budapest, which was formed on 14 November, also adopted the draft. According 
to the document after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops „the social form of 
Hungary is the social order based on the prohibition of exploitation (socialism), 
ǁhiĐh iŵplies ŵoƌe ĐoŶĐƌetelǇ…the pƌeseƌǀatioŶ of the laŶd ƌefoƌŵ of ϭϵϰϱ, ǁhiĐh 
maximized the size of estates in 11,4-ϮϮ,ϴ heĐtaƌes… the pƌeseƌǀatioŶ of the 
nationalization of the mines, banks and heavy industry, the communal property of 
the eǆistiŶg faĐtoƌies ďased oŶ ǁoƌkeƌs’ self ŵaŶageŵeŶt, ǁoƌkeƌs’ shaƌes oƌ 
profit-sharing, every possibility of the free individual or co-operative enterprises, 
with the determined guarantees of the prohibitioŶ of eǆploitatioŶ…͟ The draft 
Đould haǀe ďeeŶ ratified ďǇ a ĐoŶstitueŶt asseŵďlǇ, iŶ ǁhiĐh the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils 
could have played a decisive role.6 The trade uŶioŶs, ǁhiĐh supported Kádár’s 
                                                 
5 MagǇaƌ ŵuŶkástaŶáĐsok ϭϵϱϲ-ban. Dokumentumok. 42-43. 
6 Ibid. 132. 
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government that had been formed with the direct support of the Soviets, gave a 
similar proposal to the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government – as Kádár’s 
government was called – when they recommended the creation of a bicameral 
parliament: „For this purpose we propose that the government should consider the 
creation of the Council of Producers. As a house of the parliament the Council of 
PƌoduĐeƌs Đould ďe a Ŷeǁ oƌgaŶ of ouƌ state poǁeƌ… theƌe ǁould ďe the House of 
Representatives elected by ballot according to the principle of the place of 
ƌesideŶĐe…aŶd the CouŶĐil of Producers, whose members are elected from the 
working communities also by ballot. According to the document the basic task of 
the latteƌ is the ͞ĐoŶtƌol of pƌoduĐtioŶ aŶd distƌiďutioŶ. Thus, the diƌeĐt pƌoduĐeƌs 
could determine how the state should use its financial means and values and how 
it should alloĐate the ƌesouƌĐes… IŶ politiĐal ƋuestioŶs the ĐouŶĐil should get 
eǆteŶsiǀe ƌights to ŵake pƌoposals foƌ the House of RepƌeseŶtatiǀes͟.7 
After ϰ Noǀeŵďer Kádár ĐoŶtiŶued to Ŷegotiate ǁith the represeŶtatives of the 
ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils for ǁeeks – and not only for tactical reasons.8 He received the 
authorization for the negotiation from Moscow.9 From this aspect the 
deǀelopŵeŶt of the ŶegotiatioŶs ďetǁeeŶ the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐil of the largest 
enterprise of the country (30500 people worked in eighteen factories of the Csepel 
IroŶ aŶd Metal Works iŶ OĐtoďer ϭϵϱϲͿ aŶd the Kádár-government is particularly 
illuŵiŶatiŶg. EǀeŶ though the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils of the Csepel IroŶ aŶd Metal 
Works (which encompassed the whole Ŷetǁork of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils of the 
local factories with around 700 members, who were all volunteers and received no 
ŵoŶeǇ for their ǁorkͿ deĐlared that theǇ ǁould Ŷot reĐogŶize the Kádár-
government and they expected the return of Imre Nagy to the post of Prime 
Minister, as a basis of negotiations they insisted that the government announce in 
the Ŷeǁspapers aŶd the radio that it iŶteŶds to relǇ oŶ the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils aŶd it 
confirms their rights. „This was fulfilled on paper in a decree published in 
Népszaďadság oŶ ϭϰ Noǀeŵďeƌ ϭϵϱϲ, ǁhiĐh gaǀe the folloǁiŶg ƌights to the 
ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐils: the eǆteŶsioŶ of ǁoƌkeƌs’ self-government to every area of 
factory life, right to make decisions, the elaboration of the wage system in the 
faĐtoƌǇ, the ǁoƌkeƌs’ Đouncil can divide part of the net profit of the factory among 
the ǁoƌkeƌs. The peƌŵaŶeŶt ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐils should ďe eleĐted iŶ thƌee ǁeeks 
                                                 
7 Eszŵélet, Ŷo 2. 48-49. 
8 Several documents survived from December 1956, which reflect that the state power s ought 
to iŶtegrate the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils iŶto the reforŵed ŵaŶageŵeŶt sǇsteŵ. SiŶĐe theǇ ǁould haǀe 
been given rather extensive functions in production, this would have meant a shift towards 
corporatism. See e.g. MagǇaƌ ŵuŶkástaŶáĐsok ϭϵϱϲ-ban. Dokumentumok. A kohó – és gépipari 
ŵiŶisztériuŵ tervezete. 1956. dec. 13. 139-150. ibid.: A ǀegǇipaƌi ŵiŶisztéƌiuŵ teƌǀezete. 1956. 
nov. 21. 150-157. 
9 FEITL, MúltuŶk, Ϯϰϭ. A Soǀiet offiĐer partiĐipated iŶ the ŵeetiŶg of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐil of 
Csepel even on 30 Noveŵďer. Although the represeŶtatiǀe of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐil of the ďiĐǇĐle 
faĐtorǇ iŵŵediatelǇ protested, the Đase shoǁs that the fate of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils had Ŷot Ǉet 
been decided. „The protest, was of course, ineffective, the officer argued that he was  only 
iŶteƌested iŶ the pƌaĐtiĐal ƌealizatioŶ of the ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐil ŵodel.͟  TÓTH Eszter )sófia, iďid 
manuscript. 
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with the participation of every employee of the factory. The trade union will 
develop the final and detailed guide-lines on the election and functioning of the 
ǁoƌkeƌs’ ĐouŶĐils.͟10 
 
The fall 
 
The Ŷeǆt ϯϬ daǇs ǁere to tell the fate of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils ǁhose aĐtiǀities took 
place under the circumstances of „douďle poǁeƌ  ͟– as one of the representatives of 
the Workers’ CouŶĐil iŶ Csepel put it. But, ŶaturallǇ, this situatioŶ Đould Ŷot last loŶg. 
The 22nd Noǀeŵďer deĐree issued ďǇ the Presidiuŵ oŶ the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils proǀided 
a relatively wide sphere of authority to these institutions on the fields of bringing 
together the central-state planning and the local plans, on managing production and 
the local economic processes such as the ways of connecting profitability with wage-
payment and with the structural layout of the factory; on the method of dividing 
profits and also that of the right of veto in appointing the managers. The question of 
„how to adjust the central industry managing system to the practice of self-
management in the factories arose, and the turbulent ministry apparatuses are very 
much inclined to see this problem as the Archimedian point of the reform.  The dialogue 
ǁith its oǁŶ appaƌatuses also pushes the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt to take seƌiouslǇ the ǁoƌkeƌs’ 
ĐouŶĐils aŶd to fiŶd a Đoŵpƌoŵise ǁith theŵ.͟11 As the documents show the 
conception finally taking shape was to envisage the coexistence of different 
management sectors, that is, a kind of a mixed economy. 
But the fundamental, practical questions were answered on the political 
ďattlefield. Neither the Workers’ CouŶĐil of Great Budapest, Ŷor the ǁorkers’ 
councils in general accepted the compromising efforts of the power which purely 
iŶterpreted the iŶstitutioŶs of the ǁorkers’ self-management as productive unites. 
JáŶos Kádár deĐlared that the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils had to ŵaŶage the ĐoŵpaŶies aŶd 
factories but he added that they should not interfere in politics since it was none 
of their business.12 But Kádár’s ĐoŶĐeŶtratioŶ of poǁer graduallǇ diŵiŶished the 
role of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils ǁhiĐh got stuĐk ďetǁeeŶ the ŵiŶistries aŶd the 
factory managements which represented the interests of the ministries as well. 
The Workers’ CouŶĐil of Great Budapest eŵphasized its Ŷeed for poǁer ǁith 
strikes ǁhat the Kádár-government (and naturally the Soviet leaders behind them) 
found intolerable. The reorganized party, the Hungarian Workers’ SoĐialist PartǇ 
ǁas graduallǇ ďeĐoŵiŶg aŶ alterŶatiǀe forĐe of poǁer ǀersus the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils 
in the factories.13 The ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils theŵselǀes saǁ their role aŶd that of the 
                                                 
10 TÓTH Eszter )sófia, iďid ŵaŶusĐript. 
11 KIS JáŶos: Az 1965-57-es ƌestauƌáĐió – ϯϬ éǀ táǀlatáďól (The Restoration of 1956-57 – from the 
perspective of 30 years). IN: A foƌƌadaloŵ előzŵéŶǇei, ibid. 133. 
12 KIS JáŶos, iďid. The last ŵeetiŶg ďetǁeeŶ Kádár aŶd the leaders of HSWP aŶd the 
represeŶtatiǀes of the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils iŶ Csepel aŶd other toǁŶ took plaĐe oŶ Ϯϳth 
December, 1956. It was here that in answering the que stioŶs of the delegatioŶ Kádár said 
these ominous words. 
13 MOLNÁR JáŶos, iďid. 90-91 
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HWSP the same way.14 The fights for power  and clash of arms brought about a 
sharp-edged situation where managing a new power system and a „ŵulti paƌtǇ͟ 
socialism finally had disappeared from the agenda – eǀeŶ though the ǁorkers’ 
councils kept stressing until the last day of their existence both for the government 
and the powers of the bourgeois restoration, that „factory and land belong to the 
people, aŶd ǁe ǁill Ŷeǀeƌ giǀe theŵ ďaĐk to aŶǇoŶe͟. But the restoration of state 
socialism and the Soviet efforts to hinder a „seĐoŶd Yugoslaǀia͟ from coming into 
existence proved to express stronger interests than the spontaneous aspirations to 
put new forms of socialism into practice. The logic of the power struggles had led 
to the restoration of the one-partǇ sǇsteŵ ǁhere the HuŶgariaŶ ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils 
could not have even the highly restricted role of their Yugoslav counterparts; in 
Yugoslavia these institutions though under the double pressure of bureaucracy 
and capital could survive for a long time. Almost 30 years later, in 1990 the 
ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils suffered the saŵe fate uŶder the new conditions of civil 
parlamentarianism and multi-party system.15  
IŶ short, the HuŶgariaŶ eǆperieŶĐe had proǀed that the ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils ǁere 
able to manage the processes of production, they were able to systematically build 
up and begin to introduce a socialist-communal system of self management, but the 
local experience under the given political conditions could not survive for a long 
time, and consequently it failed. I would like to repeat that the social counter-power 
represeŶted ďǇ the ǁorkers’ councils was  not tolerated either by the one party 
system or by the multi party system restored 30 years after the events. It seems that 
self managing as an alternative social system can be successful only as a result of an 
international cooperation - because of economic and political reasons. 
The power elites celebrating the 50th anniversary of the October uprising 
refuse to tell about the theoretical and economic chances of self management 
and to re-think its legacy and this way they falsify the true socialist aspect of the 
1956 uprising. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 MOLNÁR, ibid and TÓTH E. Zs. Ibid, and RIPP )oltáŶ ibid. 234. On 9th December the government 
outlaǁed  the regioŶal ǁorkers’ ĐouŶĐils aŶd the leaders of the ǁorkers’ Đouncils were arrested; on 11th 
DeĐeŵďer SáŶdor RáĐz, the leader of the CeŶtral Workers’ CouŶĐil ǁas also arrested; the goǀerŶŵeŶt iŶ 
respoŶse to the ǁorkers’ strikes aŶd protest ŵarĐhes eǆteŶded the sĐope of ŵeaŶs of terror. 
15 The constitutional amendment in 1989 seemed to give chance for a historic moment to the self 
managing experiences but the first „deŵoĐƌatiĐ͟ parliament in 1990 amended the constitution and 
reŵoǀed § ϭϮ/Ϯ ǁhiĐh legallǇ estaďlished the ŶotioŶ of ĐolleĐtiǀe ŵorkers’ propertǇ.  
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